Introduction: An African Continental Issue

Since it was founded in 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf, the Islamic State of West Africa (ISWA), more commonly known as Boko Haram, has been a disaster for the people of Northeast Nigeria. This year, 2019, will see the fighting enter its second decade. More than 20,000 people have been killed. Some 2.1 m have been displaced. The government of Nigeria under Muhammadu Buhari, president since 2015, does not seem able to defeat the jihadists. The deadly stalemate leads to consideration that only coordinated action through the African Union or possibly the United Nations has any hope of finishing the job.

Boko Haram, the group’s colloquial name, usually is interpreted as a contraction for ‘Western education is forbidden’ in the Hausa language of the region. In its campaign for extreme Islamist rule, Boko Haram has developed a reputation for terror and bloodthirst equaled only by Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. The group attacks the Nigerian security services, government authorities, cities, schools and mosques, killing civilians and carrying girls and women into slavery.

Since 2015, Nigeria has re-established some degree of authority in the region, including Borno State, the heart of the rebellion. Essential to this progress is collaboration with the African Union, other governments in the region, and military assistance from France and the United States. But Boko Haram remains a serious threat to regional stability, its attacks involving ever more countries. For the African Union (AU) the terrorist organization is both a threat to regional peace and stability, and an opportunity to show its collaborative potential.

Like other African terrorist groups, Boko Haram has become a multi-national problem. Given the enormously long borders of Africa, and the weak ability of any single state to secure even its own borders, there are limits to what individual states can accomplish. Porous borders, typical of much of Africa, favor Boko Haram, like other terrorist organizations such as the Lord’s Resistance Army (originally from Uganda), or al-Qaeda affiliated groups of the Sahel region.

The weakness of most west African states makes it easy for a group like Boko Haram to shift operations to near-by countries. Already Nigeria’s neighbors Cameroon, Chad and Niger have been forced to join the struggle to suppress Boko Haram.

Elsewhere in Africa, other jihadist groups are spreading violence and instability, such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, in Mali and Burkina Faso. In all these cases, multi-national cooperation through the African Union seems increasingly essential to success. If the African Union can respond effectively to Boko Haram, it

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may have a winning approach to try in other regional situations.²

How to make counterterrorism cooperation more effective and decisive, with the goal of not just containing and suppressing but ending terrorist rebellions like Boko Haram, is a major and difficult question for the 55 Member States of the African Union.

Recent Events Within Boko Haram

In 2016, Boko Haram has divided into two competing factions, divided by theology and violence. The split does not appear to reflect frustrations with the terror campaign, but tactical and theological differences between particular leaders. The longtime commander of Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekau, still runs the Islamic State of West Africa (ISWA), and produces videos rejoicing in enslaving girls and ‘killing anyone God commands me to kill.’ In the judgment of *The Economist*, Shekau thinks that everyone not loyal to him or fighting for his group is an infidel, deserving death.³ Under Shekau’s command the group bombs any public gathering, often using child suicide bombers against markets and mosques.

Not all Boko Haram leaders agree with this. Among them was Mamman Nur, and Abu Musab al-Barnawi, the son of Boko Haram’s late founder. In mid-2016 they left Boko Haram to swear allegiance to the Islamic State (IS or ISIS) in Syria and Iraq (who also thought Shekau too extreme). Nur suggested that Boko Haram should only attack military targets and said that using children as human bombs might not be an act of piety. His motives may have been tactical. By not engaging in acts of needless cruelty, he thought the jihadists would be more likely to win support, or at least acquiescence, in the remote areas of north-


³ Ibid.
Measures to Suppress and Eradicate Boko Haram

eastern Nigeria where they operate. But Nur also disagreed theologically with Shekau over who is a Muslim and could be declared an infidel and therefore killed.

Splitting from the original Boko Haram, or Islamic State West Africa (ISWA), Nur and al-Barnawi formed a new group: Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). Adding to the confusion, the new faction also is known as the Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS).

Since then the two factions of Boko Haram have fought largely separate insurgencies. There is no evidence they fight each other, but Nur was killed under mysterious circumstances in 2018, possibly by more radical Boko Haram followers. But both factions remain active. Both operate primarily in Northeast Nigeria. ISWAP, now the dominant faction, operates largely to the north of Maiduguri, the main city in the region. The original Boko Haram seems to keep to the south and east (see map). In recent months, ISWAP appears to have abandoned its original policy of sparing civilians and returned to a classic Boko Haram tactic of suicide bombings against any public gathering.

Conflict Milestones

2002-2009 the group utilized its headquarters in Maiduguri for non-violent purposes. Predominantly, they conducted educational programs in religion and social welfare to youth from the Kanuri clan. Maiduguri (also locally known as Yerwa) is the capital of the Borno State, in Northeastern Nigeria. This was to become the major stronghold for Boko Haram throughout their occupation. The Kanuri are a group in Northeast Nigeria, as well as in Chad and Niger.

2009 a deal is struck between the Governor of Borno State, Ali Modu Sherriff, to give political backing in exchange for the strict enforcement to Sharia Law. This would prove to be a turbulent month for Nigeria as Boko Haram begins preaching anti-government rhetoric, attacking police stations and government buildings around Maiduguri and Bauchi.

4 Omar S. Mahmood, ‘Despite its divisions, Boko Haram is no weaker’, Institute for Strategic Studies,
26-28 July 2009 Nigerian police report killing 200 Boko Haram attempting to flee Maiduguri. It is later discovered that Mohammed Yusuf’s father-in-law, Baba Fagu was detained and subsequently killed by authorities. Shortly thereafter, Yusuf is arrested and killed as well. During the month of July, an additional 700 people were killed in the clashes and the Red Cross estimates that approximately 4,000 people were displaced from their homes.

December 2009 a publication came out condemning a documented 39 cases of killings and “enforced disappearances” by security forces. The paper claimed that Police Force Order 237 allowed officers to shoot suspects or prisoners who attempted to flee or resist arrest.

April 2010 President Goodluck Jonathan became the acting President of Nigeria. September of that same year, Boko Haram attacked the prison in Bauchi and released over 700 prisoners. On Christmas Eve the group targeted a church and killed over 30 people in the heart of the state of Plateau.

April 2011 Goodluck Jonathan, who is widely seen as a representative of the mostly-Christian south, is elected as the President.

26 August 2011 Boko Haram attacked the UN Building in Abuja, crashing into the reception area and detonating their Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED).

January 2012 185 people were killed in a coordinated attack utilizing small arms fire and bombings in the largest city of the Muslim-majority north, Kano.

July 2012 Boko Haram have bombed their first Mosque in Maiduguri, utilizing a suicide bomber during Friday prayers. Five worshippers were killed. Subsequently, Boko Haram carries on attacking soft targets to include; schools, Mosques, and media agencies.

December 2012 a local citizen group, the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) formed to assist the forces in ousting Boko Haram by providing surveillance and intelligence support. The group possesses basic small arms and recruits both men and women. Later, the CJTF would, themselves be accused of atrocities, diverting humanitarian resources and subjecting women to systemic violence. That same month the government declared a state of emergency. The northeast region becomes increasingly disenchanted with their national government due to a perceived lack of public spending, little security, poverty and illiteracy in the regions of Adamawa, Yobe, and Borno.

February 2013. Boko Haram begins to conduct raids across the border into Cameroon. The group begins to create instability in the region of Lake Chad. Other areas of the region affected are eastern Chad, southeast Niger, and the north of Cameroon. Throughout that year, the group began more sophisticated attacks against military bases, utilizing large-scale attacks, heavily armed vehicles with mounted automatic weapons.

May-December of 2013 a United Nations agency estimates 1,224 people were killed by Boko Haram, mostly in 130 villages were attacked or controlled by the group.

November 2013 the United States has officially designated Boko Haram as a terrorist organization.
April 2014 in Chibok the group kidnapped 276 schoolgirls, drawing international media attention. In May, ten Chinese workers were kidnapped in Cameroon during a raid on a construction camp raid in Waza. That same month, French President Francois Hollande hosts a summit with regional government leaders and re-forms the Multilateral Joint Task Force (MJTF).

August 2014 the group declares a self-proclaimed Islamic Caliphate in northeast Nigeria.

November 2014 27 attacks occurred. By December, the UN claims that Boko Haram has killed or contributed to the deaths of 7,831 people, created 130,000 refugees in the countries surrounding Nigeria and displaced over 1 million people internationally.

January 2015 saw the massacre in Baga, where the group burned civilians alive. Member-states of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) elect to create a MJTF Headquarters in N’djamena, Chad. By February, Chad was leading the fight against BH. They sent troops into Nigeria to spearhead the offensive into Gamboru. In March, the group swore its allegiance to Islamic States (ISIS) and changes its name to the Islamic State’s West African Province (ISWAP).

April-August of 2016 the ISWAP killed 224 people, their lowest quarterly figure in five years.

October 2016 the group released 21 of the schoolgirls from Chibok but 114 remain in captivity.5

2017 the group utilized female suicide bombers to attack a refugee camp in Maiduguri. The UN states that the Lake Chad crisis is worsening and over 10 million people need humanitarian assistance as well as warning that the group could still harm civilians in the area.

February 2018 the group kidnapped 110 schoolgirls from Government Girls Science and Technical College in Dapchi. All but four were released later.

April 2018 Boko Haram has kidnapped more than 1,000 children in the last five years, according to UNICEF. UNICEF also asserts that one in five suicide bombers employed by Boko Haram are children.

A screen grab from a video released on 2 January 2018 showing Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau amid a surge in violence casting doubt on the Nigerian government’s claim that the militant group is defeated. Photo AFP

Recent Events in the Boko Haram Campaign

Half the incidents were recorded in Nigeria’s Borno State, the epicenter of the crisis. The proportion of violence in Cameroon’s Far North province, the second most affected area, declined from 45 percent of all attacks in 2016

5 ‘Boko Haram is becoming even more extreme’, The Economist, 22 November 2018, https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-
to 35 percent in 2017. Over 90 towns and villages in Borno were targeted in 2017, but the state capital of Maiduguri had the highest number of assaults by far at 48. Most were small-scale suicide attacks on its outskirts, but reflect the continued militant obsession with the Borno State capital.\(^6\)

Fatalities are difficult to verify, but about 1,500 deaths were recorded in 2017, close to that of 2016 (despite the increased number of attacks), and significantly lower than the more than 5,000 recorded in 2015.

Nonetheless, civilians continue to suffer disproportionately, comprising 44% of all recorded deaths (the next highest category was that of militants themselves). Large-scale violence remains a feature of the conflict, as the killing of at least 50 people during a November 2017 suicide bombing at a mosque in Mubi, Adamawa, indicates.

With 30 attacks monthly on average in 2017, violence in Lake Chad is essentially a daily occurrence. Nonetheless, differentiation was recorded, with 44 attacks in June 2017, and 20 in December (see graph below). The spike in June is probably associated with the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan, a period where jihadist violence tends to increase worldwide. Ramadan in 2018 has so far not seen the same typical rise in violence.

Attack types also reveal important trends. Suicide incidents encompassed 41% of all attacks in 2017, up from 26% in 2016. The 149 recorded suicide attacks represent the highest one-year total (the next was 118 in 2015), an indication of the increased reliance on this attack style.

Of these, about half were conducted by female bombers, a percentage that has remained largely steady since the wide-scale introduction of female suicide attacks in 2014. A third of these can be categorized as ‘failed attacks’ – they were either disrupted before reaching a target, and/or did not result in any deaths aside from the bomber.

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The average JAS incident is less deadly, resulting in about four fatalities compared to ISWA’s 11.5 killed. This shows that while JAS has unleashed more violence, the less frequent attacks from ISWA can be more damaging.

Recent Events in the Military Campaign

Muhammadu Buhari, Nigeria’s president and a former general, won power in 2015 partly by promising to be tougher on Boko Haram than his predecessor, President Goodluck Jonathan. For nearly three years the Nigerian government has stuck to its claim that it has ‘technically defeated’ Boko Haram. The army has made some progress in the recovery of territory from Boko Haram. However, much more is needed to thwart the group. Recently though, the terror group demonstrated its renewed audacity with strikes at hard (military) targets.

Despite a decade of warfare and a change of government, the individual government armed forces fighting Boko Haram continue to struggle. The problems appear worst for the largest of the armed forces involved, the Nigerian Army, an organization of over 200,000 personnel.

Although fighting is largely in just one state—albeit a state the size of a small European country like Belgium or Netherlands—the Nigerian Army remains unable to assure regional peace. Borno State is effectively paralyzed, its people all refugees or internationally displaced persons (IDPs). One of the worst recent examples of military weakness was the Boko Haram attack on a Nigerian military base in Metele near the border with Niger and Chad, which reportedly left around 100 Nigerian soldiers dead and more than 150 missing, though the army insists the death toll was 23.

Showing that this success was not a unique achievement, on 13 July 2018 Boko Haram insurgents ambushed a military convoy in Borno State, Nigeria. Then on 19 July 2018 soldiers were attacked as they escorted traders close to Nigeria’s border with Cameroon. And on 21 July 2018 troops again fell victim to insurgents. Over a six-week period, four military bases were attacked, one of which was staffed by over 700 soldiers.

Boko Haram attacks on the military are designed not only to demoralize the army and encourage it to start atrocities against civilians, but also to establish their own control over territory and to acquire military equipment. Boko Haram has seized heavy weapons during approximately 20 attacks in an offensive that started in June 2018, including at least 30 gun trucks, armored

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8 Neil Munshi, ‘Under fire: why Nigeria is struggling to defeat Boko Haram’, Financial Times, 5 December 2018, [https://www.ft.com/content/62928c8e-f7b8-11e8-8b7c-6fa24bd5409c](https://www.ft.com/content/62928c8e-f7b8-11e8-8b7c-6fa24bd5409c)

personnel carriers (APCs), a main battle tank and multi-barreled rocket launchers.\textsuperscript{10}

After such reserves, the government’s primary response has been to reorganize its key military leadership in the troubled north-east of the country – a strategy that appears largely cosmetic. The game changer is more likely to come from dealing with several blind spots in the military’s approach to Boko Haram.

Altering military commanders each time a problem arises has been implemented before, with little impact on the counter-terrorism effort. Over the last two years, leadership has changed on four occasions.

This time the most significant reshuffle was of the Theatre Commander overseeing the campaign against Boko Haram. The new head of Operation Lafiya Dole, Major General Abba Dikko, replaced Major General Rogers Nicholas who occupied the position for less than a year.

Beyond leadership, three top concerns undermine the army’s current position. First, the military must investigate why a number of its bases have suffered attacks in close succession. Second, the use of intelligence must be deepened to include closer collaboration with local community actors who are familiar with the terrain in which Boko Haram operates. Third, the grievances of soldiers must be addressed to improve morale.

In addition to military targets, Boko Haram has launched deadly assaults on civilians. The extremist group’s offensives have been relatively sophisticated – probably executed by the faction of Boko Haram led by Abu Musab al-Barnawi who has a penchant for targeting the military. Nigeria’s army needs to investigate whether these attacks are the result of weak security at its bases, or because of Boko Haram’s growing strength and tactical advantage.

The new military command faces longstanding challenges when it comes to intelligence. While the rights of ordinary citizens must be safeguarded, the problem posed by Boko Haram’s spies within communities should be recognized. More than ever, this issue merits attention in light of recent revelations by apprehended members of Boko Haram.

Meanwhile, the Nigerian Army is losing legitimacy in the eyes of the Nigerian people. It is widely suspected of atrocities against civilians, including an apparent killing of dozens of demonstrators in October. This is enormously damaging to the counterterror campaign, making civilians much less likely to help the army.\textsuperscript{11}

Tensions between the army and aid workers are also a growing problem, making it harder to get aid to civilians. The Nigerian army has long viewed aid workers in Nigeria’s Northeast with suspicion and routinely bans NGOs and UN organizations like UNICEF from the region., accusing it of spying for Boko Haram. UNICEF staff privately say the problem is aid workers are a major source of reports embarrassing the army, especially atrocities against civilians.\textsuperscript{12}


African Cooperation Against Boko Haram

The current heart of regional cooperation is the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). Four of Nigeria’s neighbors, Benin, Cameroon, Chad and Niger, have agreed to contribute troops to the task force. The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) has a mandate of one year, which must be renewed annually. Currently the origination is strictly ad hoc. It is not authorized through the African Union, due in part to wariness of the governments involved, which fear losing authority. The MNJTF is designed to conduct ‘military operations to prevent the expansion of Boko Haram and other terrorist groups’ activities and eliminate their presence.”

In practice few of the allocated troops are available at any point of time. The structure permits cooperation, but Member States are under no pressure and do not routinely cooperate as much as they could.

The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) comprises units, mostly military, from Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. It is headquartered in NDjamena (Chad) and mandated to bring an end to the Boko Haram insurgency. It currently has a strength of roughly 7,000 to 10,000 personnel, all under the command of their separate national armed forces.

The task force has a long history, the result of long-standing concern about the ungoverned state of the Chad Basic region. It was first organized as a solely Nigerian force in 1994, during the administration of Sani Abacha, to "checkmate banditry activities and to facilitate free movement” along its northern border. In 1998, it was expanded to include units from neighboring Chad and Niger with the purpose of dealing with common cross-border security issues in the Lake Chad region, with its headquarters in the town of Baga, Borno State.

The Islamist insurgency in northern Nigeria intensified in the latter part of the 2000s, and security forces across the region were increasingly directly challenged by jihadist militant groups. Boko Haram and Ansaru were the most active and well known. In April 2012, the MNJTF’s mandate was expanded to encompass counter-terrorism operations.

Essential to the limited effectiveness of the MNJTF are two international commitments. First from the African Union, which authorizes the mandate for cooperation making it legally legitimate and encouraging states to cooperate. Second is a decision in 2015 made by the European Union to commit larger-scale financial resources and equipment to make the MNJTF credible. The financial and military aid also is an incentive for governments to cooperate who otherwise would not, without financial glue. Currently financing is by a renewably two-year grant of EUR 50 million from the European Union.

15 Ibid.
18 ‘Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram’, The African Union-EU Partnership,
There is still considerable skepticism in the international community that the new force can deliver results. Forces still struggle when it comes to crossing borders, even in hot pursuit of Boko Haram; even such action must be carefully negotiated. Preserving national sovereignty remains the highest priority for most governments, not counterterrorism.

The African Union is an essential element in the process, but its contribution remains limited. Most of the 55 Member States are hesitant to authorize arrangements which might compel them to contribute money or personnel. They want to support Nigeria and other countries of the Chad Basin, not contribute to their counterterror program directly. Similarly, the governments of the Chad Basin and states contributing to the MNJTF are not happy about losing sovereign control over their forces, not even to the African Union.

This leads on observer to conclude: ‘the AU has not directional or positional approach to the Nigerian conundrum. There has been, however, a potent coalition—multinational task force to contain the violent; the only effective response from Nigeria’s neighbors and this is because of geopolitical proximity. I suggest as long term solutions, non-militaristic approaches to the Nigerian dilemma and addressing corruption.’

Proposals for Action

There are innumerable options facing the Member States of the African Union as they wrestle with these issues. Three options include:

Establishing a uniform command for the MNJTF: Currently all countries involved in the campaign against Boko Haram work independently and try to coordinate their actions for greater effect. To make greatest use of their resources, the states of the Chad Basin could instead establish a single fully integrated military and security service command to coordinate all intelligence on Boko Haram, focus military cooperation strategically and tactically, and maximize the impact for foreign military assistance from donor countries like France and the United States.

What this mechanism would look like must be decided by the countries involved and possibly by the Member States of the African Union as well. The African Union can offer its own legitimacy to encourage such cooperation. It also can ask countries currently cooperating through the MNJTF to replace voluntary with mandatory cooperation.

De-mobilizing radical combatants: It’s a rule of counterinsurgency that states cannot kill their way to victory. Killing might work in the short run, but tends create new anger and recruit more rebels in the long run. Terror or insurgent groups must be persuaded to stop fighting. Even if Boko Haram were defeated, its members and extremist ideology almost certainly would live on, and other groups – or remnants of Boko Haram itself – could pick up where it left off. Thus persuasion must be part of any campaign to end its threat.

https://issafrica.org/issa-today/au-summit-29-eradicating-more-than-just-boko-haram
The principle tool for the international community is DDR, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. Typically this means working with terrorist or insurgent leaders, persuading them to surrender their group, in exchange for assurances for the personal security, the economic welfare of their soldiers, and a place in future society. DDR programs are expensive, requiring financial incentives for disarmament and cooperation, as well as financial guarantees for former fighters. There also is a political price; they often are unpopular with the people previously targeted by the fighters.

Problems to be solved including winning support among host governments to support DDR instead of exclusively relying on military campaigns, offering some combination of force and positive incentives, finding donor governments to finance disarmament and reintegration, and persuading former victims to accept the legitimacy of the process. Past success in Africa that might serve as a model for DDR include programs in Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, Mozambique and Sierra Leone.

Study the issue: A classic method for states hesitating to commit themselves to a course of action with repercussions, is to recommend further study. The African Union Member States could authorize a study of counterterrorism issues in the Chad Basic region, collect data to determine the best way to act. A resolution could authorize further study and authorize that the findings from the study be utilized with the purpose of finding the best way to access persons displaced or victims of atrocities to provide humanitarian aid. Another goal might be to advise the African Union Member States on the best way to support the Multi-National Task Force without prejudicing the interests of member-states, themselves, becoming directly involved in the fighting, or to minimize that involvement to the degree possible.

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