The Security Council

Ending the Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict

By: Nicholas Shinn
Introduction

The Security Council has been called to session to discuss the urgent importance attributed to efforts towards ending the “frozen” conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh. Since the initial secession of the small, mountainous enclave in the western territory of Azerbaijan in the late 1980s, the Karabakh conflict has seen the mass exodus of tens of thousands of Karabakh Armenians and Azeris as popular militias from both sides sought to secure control of the territory. As events on the ground began to escalate on top of the breakup of the Soviet Union, a vast number of variables from domestic unrest in Azerbaijan’s capital to extremist elements of the Karabakh Armenians whom hold control of seven Azerbaijani provinces outside Nagorno-Karabakh pushed this conflict to international attention. The efforts of numerous international summits held by multinational organizations such as the Minsk Group, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as well as the United Nations Security Council have moved the conflict to what one could call and stable condition of uncertainty balancing on a tightrope beginning to untether before the world.

According to Thomas de Waal, an expert specializing in the South Caucasus region and the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, labeling the conflict as a frozen conflict is misleading. While a cease-fire has been in place since 1994, both countries have been allocating substantial
amounts of money towards boosting the defense and military sectors of each state with rhetoric from each side shining a light on how quickly the current arms race could lead to a massive escalation in the fighting. Furthermore given the exodus of refugees and IDPs from western Azerbaijan into Iran to the south in conjunction with Russian and Turkish influences very much present in the conflict, any large escalation in the fighting between Azerbaijan and Armenia would inevitably usher in a larger proxy conflict between the three regional giants. The fragility of the South Caucasus cannot be emphasized enough given the condition of the international security environment around the region; with the Islamic State continuing to secure the territory of its caliphate across the Middle East and North Africa, the new offensives carried out by the Turkish government against the Kurdish PKK as well as Iranian influence across the region in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq in addition to the issues around the Saudi-led operations within Yemen, efforts to prevent the destabilization of the South Caucasus is of immense importance.

A successfully implemented resolution regarding bring peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan requires an understanding of the events which lead to the secession of Karabakh and the Armenian occupation of western Azerbaijan. It also requires a recognition of the historical significance of both the Armenian and Azeri nations, whom both have deeply held ties to Nagorno-Karabakh as well as the stakes held by all those a party to the conflict. At the end of the day, delegates will find themselves facing the conflicting interests within the rights held by a state to maintain sovereign rule and territorial integrity with a region seeking the right of self-determination and autonomy for the Nagorno Karabakh Republic (NKR).

Background:

The beginnings of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict have deeply embedded roots that go far back before the outbreak of conflict in the late 1980s. The Caucasus Mountains has seen the influences of a number of empires over the course of history, such as Persian, Ottoman, Russian and European control over the region presently known as Armenia and Azerbaijan. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the signing of the Treaty of Serves at the end of World War 1, the numerous minorities which composed the Ottoman Empire began gaining independence. Seeing as the Russian Empire held control over the South Caucasus following World War 1, the three republics of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan saw an opening for independence with the collapse of the Russian Empire and established the short-lived Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic.
This was a short-lived collective of Caucasus republics that eventually was invaded by the Soviet Union lead to the end of the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic and the new era of the Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republics. Something of key importance during the era of Soviet leadership in the Caucasus, many Azerbaijanis and Armenians had lived together peacefully during this time together up until the era of glasnost ushered in by Soviet leader, Gorbachev. Once the declaration of secession came from the inhabitants of Nagorno Karabakh, ethnic tensions increased as many Karabakhi Azerbaijanis were fled the province the Karabakhi Armenians had taken control over. Numerous instances of ethnic violence against the so-called “other” were occurring well before the full scale interstate war broke out. The pogroms of Sumgait in which anti-Armenian violence took over parts of Azerbaijan in 1988 and other episodes of ethnic violence within Azerbaijan and the breakaway Nagorno Karabakh region reinforced nationalistic rhetoric coming from Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Over the course of the 1990s during the peak of violence between the two states, both Azerbaijani and Armenian communities found themselves being ethnically cleansed from Nagorno Karabakh and regions within Azerbaijan. The largest escalation of the conflict came after Karabakh Armenians had consolidated control over the entire Nagorno-Karabakh enclave and pushed further into Azerbaijan, eventually conquering and occupying Kelbajar and Lachin to the west, Aghdam to the northeast and Fizuli, Jebrail, Kubatly and Zangelan to the south. These Azerbaijani provinces outside of the Nagorno-Karabakh exclave which Armenian forces now occupy lead to a further exodus of Azerbaijani communities east deeper into Azerbaijan and south across the River Araxes into Iran, changing the nature of the conflict from simply securing the self-determination and independence of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. With these gains by the Armenian military forces occurring amidst numerous international efforts to secure a peaceful settlement to the conflict, the new issue of
securing a peaceful withdrawal of Armenian forces from provinces outside of Nagorno-Karabakh became of crucial importance once a cease-fire was implemented in May of 1994. With these gains by the Armenian military forces occurring amidst numerous international efforts to secure a peaceful settlement to the conflict, the new issue of securing a peaceful withdrawal of Armenian forces from provinces outside of Nagorno-Karabakh became of crucial importance once a cease-fire was implemented in May of 1994.

Since the implementation of the cease-fire, numerous international organizations such as the United Nations Security Council and the Minsk Group created by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe have invested vast amounts of time acting as mediators between the two South Caucasus countries in an effort to find a solution which can reestablish peace between the two states by respecting the legitimate claims of both sides. The efforts put forth by members of the Security Council as they convene for this session of ODUMUNC 39 could lead to a serious framework for peace and future prosperity given the ability of all members to highlight the grievances of the Armenians, the Azerbaijanis and even the Karabakhis.

Diplomacy in the Lead Up to the Cease-Fire:

Zheleznovodsk Declaration

The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh had gone on for four years before any serious international efforts to ending the conflict began; the first of these diplomatic meetings to bring about a framework to peace was convened in the Russian town of Zheleznovodsk in September of 1991 under the mediation of the presidents of Russia and Kazakhstan. From this meeting, a declaration signed by the leaders of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation in which ten points outlined a road map to establishing a cease fire through the creation of an observer group of Russian and Kazakh representatives. This group would oversee the return of people whom had been displaced from their homes during the conflict as well as the immediate release of hostages and the normalization of railway, air traffic and communication systems. The authorities of Azerbaijan and Armenia also agreed to approve delegations to begin bilateral negotiations which would put forth proposals for the stages of conflict settlement within a month of the issuing of the communique. Despite this effort to bring the parties to the conflict together, the fighting in Karabakh destabilized the proposed peace plan after a helicopter crashed killing twenty-two in late November.

Tehran Communiqué

Eight months after the negotiations in Zheleznovodsk, a second meeting between the heads of Armenia and
Azerbaijan were held with the Islamic Republic of Iran mediating the talks in May of 1992. Both the Armenian and Azerbaijani delegations expressed gratitude to Iran and other international and regional organizations for their efforts directed at finding a peaceful settlement to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in a way that brings forth the normalization of peaceful bilateral relations based on the principles of the Committee for Security and Cooperation in Europe and international law. The communique also noted of a temporary cease-fire proposal that facilitated the opening of all communication roads for economic needs and further emphasized that all questions regarding bilateral relations between the two countries should be solved via meetings and consultations. While the good work outlined in the communique would point towards successful progress in ending the conflict, Armenian offenses into Lachin province continue eleven days after the release of the communique.

The fighting only intensified further in 1993 as Armenian forces captured Kelbajar Region which resulted in the United Nations Security Council to pass Resolution 822, calling for an end to all hostilities and the immediate withdrawal of Armenian forces from the Kelbajar in April. Despite the UNSC Resolution, Armenian forces continued to make gains in the offenses into Azerbaijan resulting in the capture of Martakert, Aghdam, Fizuli, Jebrail and Kubatly by the end of August. In July, the UN had issued a second condemnation of the Armenian occupation of Agdam with the passing of UNSC Resolution 853, calling yet again for the immediate withdrawal of Armenian forces from the province.

The CSCE’s “Adjusted Timetable of Urgent Steps”

As the international community was focused on the intensifying situation within the Caucasus, highlighted by the Security Council resolutions calling for an immediate end to all hostilities, the Committee for Security and Cooperation in Europe (later to be renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) had been developing a step-by-step approach consisting of a mutually responsive series of measures aimed at implementing the goals of UNSC Resolutions 822 and 853 as soon as possible. This came to be known as the “Adjusted Timetable of Urgent Steps to Implement Security Council Resolutions 822 and 853” and would act as the framework for OSCE conflict resolution in the future Prague Process of 2004 and Madrid Principles of 2007. The plan is highlighted by six key areas including withdrawal of troops from the districts of Kubatly, Aghdam, Fizuli, Jebrail and Martakert; the restoration of all communications and transportation; the establishment of a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire under the monitoring of the CSCE; the opening of the Minsk Conference to establish a lasting peace; the exchanging of hostages and prisoners of war; and unimpeded access of
international humanitarian relief to the conflict-affected areas of Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan. This peace plan was very comprehensive and resulted in UNSC Resolution 874 on 14 October 1993 which called on all parties to accept the timetable and respect the August ceasefire which held throughout the month of September until it was interrupted on 24 October, ten days after UNSC Res. 874 passed when Armenian forces yet again made offensives into Azerbaijani territory, capturing Horadiz and later capturing Zangelan on 29 October. The violations of the three previous Security Council resolutions led to the passing of UNSC Resolution 884 on 12 November, condemning the ceasefire violations and calling on the government of Armenia to use its influence to ensure that the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians comply with the terms of a cease-fire and for Armenian forces to withdraw from the Zangelan region. Gains by Azerbaijan in recapturing parts of Kelbajar would continue into the beginning of 1994 until another round of meeting were held in May 1994 in Kyrgyzstan.

The Bishkek Protocol and the Achievement of a Cease Fire

In the midst of peak fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan over control of Nagorno-Karabakh, the meeting under the parliamentary session of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Bishkek on 5 May 1994 would be a landmark meeting in the history of the conflict. All parties to the conflict were able to take the progress made during past negotiations and summits and formulate them into a plan that worked in conjunction with the Minsk Group’s plan of conflict resolution. The protocol which came from the meetings in Kyrgyzstan included the need for wide-ranging autonomy for Nagorno-Karabakh while maintaining sovereignty of Azerbaijan; implementation of measures to guarantee security of Nagorno-Karabakh via peacekeeping operations carried out by a third party; the withdrawal of Armenian forces from occupied territories in Azerbaijan; special status given to the Lachin Corridor which links Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia as well as similar measure for Nakhchivan and Azerbaijan; and securing the return of refugees on both sides of the conflict to their homes. The terms of this proposed cease fire would formally come into effect on 12 May 1994, but Armenian forces would continue to hold control over the seven disputed territories.

The situation in Nagorno-Karabakh has remained at this stalemated cease-fire with periodic skirmishes alone the ceasefire line and despite the principles proposed by the Minsk Group’s Prague Process and Madrid Principles. Both methods of bringing a complete end to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh focus on the legal status of the republic, the right of IDPs to safely return back to their homes in the Armenian controlled portions of the disputed territories and the return of control of those territories back to the republic of Azerbaijan.
Current Situation:

The current status of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations have remained fairly static since the implementation of the ceasefire in 1994. While full scale inter-state war has not seen a resurgence, many outside observers to the conflict fear that the fragility of the peace is at a serious risk. In November 2014, the level of hostilities between the two states became even more evident as Azerbaijani forces successfully shoot down an Armenian helicopter. Daily cross-border fire by snipers on each side has become a daily occurrence, yet the number of casualties has remained relatively low compared to other large conflicts to the south in Syria and Iraq. Despite the low level priority of the conflict in the eyes of the international community which currently is grappling the war against ISIS in Syria and Iraq, the conflict in Yemen with the Houthis, a resumed conflict with the Kurdish PKK by Turkey and the peacekeeping efforts in Eastern Ukraine, the potential for the Karabakh conflict to deteriorate into a much larger scale war between Armenia and Azerbaijan would only further destabilize the region.

The risk of continued war between Armenia and Azerbaijan is further evident by the increase in nationalist rhetoric by President Aliev of Azerbaijan and President Sargsyan of Armenia, both of whom have pushed to further increase the level of expenditures on defense. This arms race becomes incredibly dangerous to maintained peace in Nagorno-Karabakh because it runs the real risk of a so-called “war by accident” given the continued fire fights along the Line of Contact along the eastern border of Nagorno-Karabakh. The increased threat of international terrorist networks across the globe also poses a significant danger to the Karabakh conflict.

During the peak of the war with Armenia and Azerbaijan, reports that Azerbaijani forces had received a large contingent of Afghan mujahideen fighters.
supporting their efforts as well as Kurdish PKK militants using the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave and other parts of Armenia to train fighters and aid Armenian forces in the conflict. This history of short-term alliances between these factions not only run the risk of seeing an extension of the Islamic State affiliated groups establishing themselves in the region as it has in other parts of the globe, such as in Nigeria, Sinai Province and parts of Chechnya, but further runs the risk of bringing larger powers into the conflict such as Turkey as it combats the Kurdish PKK.

The importance of maintain peace in the South Caucasus is paramount to continued global peace efforts, especially seeing as the work done by the OSCE’s Minsk Group in mediating a cease fire to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh has since been applied to the situation in Eastern Ukraine. As fragile as that conflict is with its incredibly shaky cease-fire in place, a collapse in peace in the Nagorno-Karabakh could send a demoralizing message to those following the plan in Ukraine and lead to a further destabilization of the security environment. As it was when the cease-fire was put in place, the claims of the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis have been the same; Armenians seek to see that Nagorno-Karabakh’s right to self-determination be respected and implemented, yet they fall short of calling for reunification or annexation of the province into Greater Armenia. Azerbaijani negotiators have for the most part shown a growing openness to moving forward with allowing the independence of Karabakh, but see the continued occupation of the seven Azeri provinces outside of Nagorno-Karabakh and continued border clashes along the Line of Contact as a barrier to peace and a sticking point for increasingly nationalistic rhetoric which calls for further increases in defense spending.

Role of the Security Council:

The role of the Security Council is incredibly relevant to the conflict resolution in Nagorno Karabakh. The council is tasked with the following functions and powers:

- To maintain international peace and security in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations;
- To investigate any dispute or situation which might lead to international friction;
- To recommend methods of adjusting such disputes or the terms of settlement;
- To formulate plans for the establishment of a system to regulate armaments;
- To determine the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression and to recommend what action should be taken;
- To call on Members to apply economic sanctions and other
measures not involving the use of force to prevent or stop aggression;

- To take military action against an aggressor;
- To recommend the admission of new Members;
- To exercise the trusteeship functions of the United Nations in “strategic areas”;
- To recommend to the General Assembly the appointment of the Secretary-General and, together with the Assembly, to elect the Judges of the International Court of Justice.

Maintained international peace cannot be sustained solely following the OSCE Minsk Group framework for the cease-fire. The UNSC must look at not only the Armenian and Azerbaijani claims to the disputed enclave, but additionally the Karabakh regional government in order to come to a mutually beneficial resolution to this dispute. Many of the terms of settlement have been laid out by past negotiations but a lack of effective cease-fire monitoring and increased nationalist rhetoric from both sides coinciding with increased military spending highlights how essential successfully negotiating a peace settlement is for the Security Council.

Furthermore, the real possibility of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic being given its right to self-determination and becoming a new member to the United Nations calls for a number of changes both on the Armenian and Azeri fronts which the Security Council as well as the international community will have to facilitate if a true end to hostilities is to occur.

**Relevant Country Positions**

**Armenia**

The Armenian claim is an ancient one which looks back at the historically significance of the nation and the Nagorno-Karabakh or “Artsakh” enclave. Karabakh is the last Armenian frontier dividing the region between East and West, Christianity and Islam. After the 1915 Armenian Genocide and Treaty of Sevres, Armenia held a sliver of territory within what nationalist historians consider Greater Armenia which would stretch from the Trebezoid on the Black Sea coast to Baku along the Caspian Sea. While Armenia initially was not officially in the conflict when Karabakh first seceded from Azerbaijan, the disintegration of the Soviet Union gave the nation extensive Russian weaponry left over by the Soviets which gave Armenians great benefits in their campaign.

Today, Armenia’s alliance with Russia is still quite strong with Armenia accepting a security guarantee from Russia that allowed for a military base and 4,000 to 5,000 Russian troops within the nation. This large ally to the north is part of the reason
Armenia has felt confident pushing for increased defense spending. Russia provides significant aid to the country in the realm of hydroelectric and nuclear energy; however, proposed increases in the electricity price by the Russian firm brought Armenians out to the streets of Yerevan in protest of the hikes.

Regarding the current state of peace talks, Armenia sees that the only avenue to successful peace is an allowance for Nagorno-Karabakh to decide its own status. Some large impediments to reaching this deal have been objections by the government in Stepanakert, the Nagorno-Karabakh capital, who see that any solution must include the inclusion of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic at the table.

Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan’s claim to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict centers around the legitimate grievances held around the loss of the seven de jure territories outside of the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave. Even at the 70th session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Azerbaijani delegation emphasized its use of Article 51 which allows for a State to use self-defense to preserve the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the polity. The numerous reports by NGOs of atrocities committed by various Popular Front militias in Karabakh, notably the Armenian Nationalist Movement and Dashnaktsutium, were essential in Armenian successes in the conflict. Domestic unrest and factionalism within the leadership in Baku also lead to unsuccessful and successful coup d’etats and hindered Azerbaijan’s ability to implement strategic movement of forces.

Aside from the shortcomings during the conflict, Azerbaijan holds a bit of leverage over European observers through its large oil supply along the Caspian Sea. The oil pipeline from Azerbaijan to Turkey through Georgia successfully isolated Armenia from profits it may have gained from a pipeline through the nation. As far as peace talks go, Azerbaijan centers on the need for Armenia to withdrawal its forces from Kelbajar, Lachin, Aghdam, Fizuli, Zengelan, Kubatly and Jebrail. Both the Azerbaijani and the Armenian delegation have come very close to reaching a solution on the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh, but achieving this goal hinges on a withdrawal of Armenian forces from Azerbaijan. As both states continue to ramp up defense spending and Azerbaijan continues to foster closer ties with Turkey, a historical enemy of Armenia, efforts towards achieving all these goals will become increasing important for the delegates of the Security Council.

China

Chinese interests have been fairly minor in the Caucasus up until the beginning of the 21st century when it began increasing its role in regional energy projects and enhancing trade and communication with countries in the Caucasus. In 1999, Armenia received 8 Chinese Typhoon
multiple rocket systems from a private Chinese company which shocked Azerbaijan, but this did not hinder the development of bilateral ties between Baku and Beijing in 2005. China holds the capacity to be a real player in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but as of now remains only an observer to the conflict.

The European Union

The involvement of Europe in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the Caucasus have been mostly economic, primarily focusing on developing the East-West corridor’s transportation and communication infrastructure as well as building energy ties with Azerbaijan. Britain, Germany, France and Italy have expressed support for territorial integrity while backing peace negotiations on the various ethnic secessionist conflicts in the region; a number of these countries are participating members in the OSCE Minsk Group. Luckily the comparative trust between the EU and Russia has helped advance a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; however, with deteriorating relations over the Ukrainian civil war could draw some divisions between efforts to resort peace.

Iran

Iran has played a relatively balanced role in the conflict seeing as it has taken the role of hosting and facilitating the exodus of refugees across the River Araxes. While other Islamic nations like Turkey have tilted towards supporting the Azeri cause, Iran has at time given its support to Christian Armenia. Iran also has expressed anger at the presence of US companies in the Caspian Sea region to secure energy exports as well as dismay at the friendly relations between Azerbaijan and Israel. The high populations of ethnic Azeris stokes fear in Iran that secessionist sentiments in the north could lead to further tensions.

The Islamic World

The Islamic World has been divided in its assessment of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. On the one hand, the Organization of the Islamic Conference was the first international body to openly condemn Armenia for aggression in the conflict, calling for the immediate and unconditional liberation of the occupied Azeri territories. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other Gulf States have given assistance to Azeri refugees as well as partnered with Azerbaijan in the realms of energy, trade and investment. However, some Muslim countries such as Lebanon and Syria have developed strong ties with Armenia given the large Armenian communities in these countries as a result of the Armenian diaspora. While Islamic countries have not played a direct role in the peace process, they are important factors due to their capabilities of providing large sums of humanitarian aid, weapons and money to various hard line Islamic groups in the region.
Russia

The Russian Federation has found itself in an interesting position geopolitically in regards to the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Russia had initially supplied both sides of the conflict, primarily due to the corrupt local commanders whom sought private profits from selling weapons after the fall of the USSR. Many analysts have said that Russia has a stake in fueling both sides of the conflict in order to keep the newly independent Armenia and Azerbaijan weakened and within Russia’s influence; however, many Azerbaijanis see Russia’s actions as disproportionately favoring Armenia which would make sense due to the historical ties Armenia and Russia share. Azerbaijan’s linguistic and cultural connections to Turkey, a NATO member, also put Russia in a position to advance greater ties with Armenia throughout the conflict. Russian-Armenian ties are evident throughout the framework of the Collective Security Treaty of the Commonwealth of Independent States where Russia holds two military bases within Armenia, owns 90% of its energy facilities and cooperates militarily with Armenia significantly.

At the moment, Russia has played a more balanced role in Nagorno-Karabakh due to improved relations with Baku under Vladimir Putin whom visited Azerbaijan in 2001 and has declared that Moscow would recognize any peace deal agreed upon by both sides of the conflict.

The United States

Vast energy reserves within the Caspian Sea and the region’s geostrategic importance in the fight against international terrorist has kept Washington’s interest in the Caucasus. The powerful Armenian lobby within the USA helped push the US Congress to pass Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act of 1992 which barred the United States government from lending assistance to Azerbaijan. Despite this brief setback in US-Azeri relations, the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline following the 1994 agreement with Western energy companies and Baku signaled a major victory for the US as they saw the move as integrated Georgia and Azerbaijan towards the West.

Washington has played a key role in the peace process in Nagorno-Karabakh, notably sponsoring a series of meetings between the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan such as the 2002 Key West talks which saw a deal come nearly within reach even though neither side was willing to compromise on the chief issue of Nagorno-Karabakh’s status. The fact that both the United States and Russia are co-chairs within the OSCE Minsk Group has drawn harsh criticism from Azerbaijan whom see the group as ineffective due to the competing interests of the two nations; however, the co-chairs of the group are but only facilitators of the negotiations, not the negotiators.

Conclusion:
The situation in the South Caucasus is a fragile and frozen stalemate that is on the fringes of becoming a full-scale inter-state conflict if left unresolved. The current international security environment has become much more dynamic since the fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of international terror organizations, international criminal organizations and the exporting of extremist ideologies in the 21st century all pose a significant risk to stability in the region. A lot of good work has been done in the realm of mediating an end to the conflict by the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the United Nations Security Council, but a true solution to the conflict is reliant upon all parties to come to a consensus and for all parties to respect the agreements put forth by international mediators. A number of questions should be considered going forward in negotiating an end to the conflict. How do states facilitate a peaceful transition of authority over disputed regions? What role can the UN Security Council play in maintaining peace and stability in the region given a resurgence in violence? What can international organizations within the United Nations do to help improve the conditions in the conflict-affected regions of the Caucasus? How do you balance the legitimacy of the principles of territorial integrity and self-determination when finding a solution to the conflict? How can the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic be successfully integrated into the international community as a recognized state? What areas of the UN Charter are most relevant to bringing a peaceful resolution to the Karabakh conflict? These are just a few questions I encourage you to ponder as you prepare for the upcoming session of the Security Council at ODUMUNC 39.
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